Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

Seton Hall Law

5-1-2014

Mind the Gap: Redefining Exhaustion and Zeig's
Role in the Judicial Construction of Excess
Insurance Policies
Patrick Kevin Coughlin

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Coughlin, Patrick Kevin, "Mind the Gap: Redefining Exhaustion and Zeig's Role in the Judicial Construction of Excess Insurance
Policies" (2014). Law School Student Scholarship. 423.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/423

Mind the Gap: Redefining Exhaustion and Zeig's Role in the Judicial Construction of
Excess Insurance Policies

Patrick Coughlin
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Basics of Insurance Coverage and the Use of Excess Insurance in the Commercial
Context.
The traditional concept of carrying insurance to hedge against the risk of fmancialloss is,
in its most basic form, readily understandable to the casual reader. If John Doe becomes ill or
gets into an auto accident, he will most likely expect, providing that he is insured, the insurer to
cover at least a portion of his fmancialloss. If John's insurance provider denies coverage, he is
free to argue that the loss falls within the scope of the policy. 1 In many instances this formulaic
approach to the resolution of disputes can even carry over to the realm of commercial insurance?
However, things can become far more complicated when examining disputes involving
commercial entities facing larger, sometimes astronomically larger, threats of exposure. In these
cases, resolving disputes over coverage often involves multiple insurance companies, all with
their own individual policies and an interest in limiting their own liability to avoid paying for
damages outside the scope of their contracts with the insured?

1

See Douglas R. Richmond, Rights and Responsibilities of Excess Insurers, 78 DENV. U. L.
REv. 29, 55 (2000).
2
See. e.g., Wm. C. Vick Const. Co. v. Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 52 F. Supp. 2d 569
(E.D.N.C. 1999).
3
See Richard Squire, How Collective Settlements Camouflage the Costs of Shareholder
Lawsuits, 62 DuKE L.J. I, 3 (2012) ("When a lawsuit's trial outcome is uncertain, the primary
insurer is biased toward trial, the insured defendants are biased toward settling before trial, and
the excess insurers divide in their biases based on where the expected damages fall within the
tower [of coverage].") For a more detailed discussion of the potential problems posed by the
individual insurers' motivations see irifra Part V.B.
I

Common themes emerge when analyzing insureds' considerations regarding insuring
against potential losses, namely "(1) the amount of coverage required to protect themselves
against losses; (2) breadth or scope of coverage; and sometimes (3) the cost of insuring against
potentially severe losses."4 To account for these interwoven and at times competing concerns,
many commercial entities have adopted what has been labeled a "tiered" insurance scheme 5
Under this approach, insureds will supplement liability insurance with "excess" or "umbrella"
policies, often with completely different insurance companies, to insure against the risk of
catastrophic loss should the entity be subject to substantial economic exposure or civilliability. 6
Lee M. Brewer and Barbara Ewing, provided a hypothetical model for the basic structure of a
coverage tower:
(1) A Primary Policy with limits of$10 million;
(2) A First-Layer Excess Policy with limits of $10 million once the limits of (1)
were exhausted;
(3) A Second-Layer Excess Policy with limits of$10 million once the limits of(1)
and (2) are exhausted;
(4) A Third-Layer Excess Policy with limits of $10 million once the limits of (1),
(2) and (3) are exhausted; and

4

3-29A New Appleman Insurance Law Practice Guide 29A.OI.
See Lee M. Brewer and Barbara Ewing, Exhaustion-What Does It Mean?, 16 FIDELITY L.J.
207, 208-09 (Oct. 2010).
6
Because in many cases no one insurer will be willing to underwrite the entire potential loss,
insureds must take out policies with more than one insurer, each responsible for a portion of the
insured's desired coverage. See id. See, e.g., Trinity Homes LLC v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 629
F.3d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff had multiple primary policies with additional umbrella
policy in case liability exceed or fell outside the scope of the primary policies); Citigroup, Inc. v.
Federal Ins. Co., 649 F.3d 367, 369 (5th Cir. 2011) (Plaintiff "purchase[d] integrated risk
policies from ten insurers that provided a total of $200 million in coverage."); Koppers Co., Inc.
v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1444 (3d Cir. 1996) ("The district court limited the
scope of the trial to twelve specific policies, which provided multiple layers of occurrence based,
excess liability coverage for third-party property damage.") (emphasis added); Sherwin-Williams
Co. v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 105 F.3d 258, 259-60 (6th Cir. 1997) (in addition to
excess insurance, plaintiff maintained multiple primary policies with several different insurers).
5

2

(5) A Fourth-Layer Excess Policy with limits of$10 million once the limits of (I),
(2), (3) and (4) are exhausted?

While the issues raised by this note are undoubtedly complex in nature, their proper
resolution can be found in a return to well-established and foundational principles of contract
interpretation.
B. The Scope of This Note

The purpose of this note is to analyze the disparate methods of construing excess
insurance policies within the federal courts. Specifically, this note will address the debate over
whether public policy considerations favoring out-of-court settlement of disputes should render
excess insurers liable even when the primary insurers have settled cases for less than the full
policy amount. The overarching question is whether a settlement with an underlying insurer for
less than the limits of the underlying policy can properly "exhaust" that policy for the purposes
of accessing excess coverage.• An examination of the state of the law reveals that the circuits are
currently split over the extent to which the goal of encouraging settlements should inform

7

Brewer and Ewing, supra note 5, at 208-09. See also, e.g., Comerica Inc. v. Zurich American
Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1021-22 (E.D. Mich. 2007); Maximus, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins.
Co., No. 1:11cv1231 (LMBtrRJ), 2012 WL 848039, at *1 (E.D. Va. March 12, 2012).
8
This article deals solely with the ramifications for vertical exhaustion, as opposed to horizontal
exhaustion. Vertical exhaustion concerns the relationship between primary and excess insurers
during a given year or specified time period. See Richmond, supra note 1, at 79. Horizontal
exhaustion is more commonly encountered in instances of "continuous loss," where a court must
look to coverage questions spanning multiple years in determining coverage liability. See id.
("Horizontal exhaustion means that the primary insurance must be exhausted across all of the
triggered policy periods before the next layer of coverage, whether excess or umbrella, must
respond to a continuous loss.") (internal quotations omitted).
Also, in this article I will not attempt to address the question of whether excess insurers
can be required to provide "drop-down" coverage in the case of a primary insurer's insolvency.
For a discussion on "drop-down" coverage see Continental Marble & Granite v. Canal Ins. Co.
785 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1989); Revco D.S., Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 791 F.
Supp. 1254 (N.D. Oh. 1991); Washington ins. Guar. Assoc. v. Guaranty Nat'! Ins. Co., 685 F.
Supp. 1160 (W.D. Wa. 1988).

3

judicial policy construction.9 This split has its roots in a Second Circuit decision from 1928. In
Zeig v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co./ 0 the Second Circuit held that, because public policy
considerations favor out-of-court settlement of disputes, a court could find that an insured had
functionally "exhausted" its primary coverage even though it had settled with its primary insurer
for less than the policy limits, thus permitting it to tap into excess coverage. 11
In Part II of this article I will lay the groundwork for our inquiry by analyzing the Second
Circuit's decision in Zeig. 12 Additionally, I will demonstrate how, although post-Erie, federal
common law has been resoundingly rejected, the policy arguments set forth by the court in Zeig
have survived as a doctrinal tool, operating in concert with and sometimes independently of state
law, for those courts wishing to broadly defme "exhaustion" as it applies to excess insurance
contracts. 13
In Part III I will examine Zeig' s current viability as public policy doctrine through an
examination of two recent decisions from the federal circuits: the Seventh Circuit's adoption of
9

See supra Part liLA.
23 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1928).
11
See id. at 666. See also Brewer and Ewing, supra note 5, at 211 ("Not surprisingly, excess
policies virtually all contain "exhaustion" clauses; and policy writers strive to word them so
carefully that no one can misunderstand. The language must be unambiguous. But what is
blazingly clear to a policy writer may have the opposite effect on a judge.").
12
See infra Part ILA.
13
See infra Part ILB. Despite its roots in the federal courts, Zeig' s policy conclusions have
permeated downward into state forums. In recent years, numerous insureds have relied on Zeig
in arguing for a broader view of exhaustion. Consequently, state courts have grappled with the
issue and are currently split over the extent to which public policy can inform policy
interpretation. Compare Qualcomm, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 161 CaL
App. 4th 184, 197 (CaL App. 4th Dist., 2008) ("We are not persuaded that Zeig compels excess
coverage in this case."); Intel Corp. v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 51 A.3d 442, 450 (DeL 2012)
(applying California law) ("We fmd Zeig inapplicable here as well: the plain language of the
policy controls."); with Reliance Ins. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 826 So. 2d 998, 999 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2001) ("We align ourselves with Zeig ... the leading case in this area.");
Rummel v. Lexington Ins. Co., 123 N.M. 752, 763 (1995) ("There are strong public policy
reasons for permitting the underlying insurer to settle for less than its policy limits.") (citing
Zeig, 23 F .2d at 666). These decisions are, for the most part, outside the scope of this article.
10

4

Zeig in Trinity Homes v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 14 and the Fifth Circuit's rejection of Zeig in
Citigrozp Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co. 15 I will also summarize the competing policy implications
under both approaches. 16
In Part IV I will argue for uniformly adopting the Fifth Circuit's approach in Citigroup,
rejecting Zeig and enforcing the four comers approach to the interpretation of excess insurance
policies. 17

Finally, in Part V, I will attempt to summarize the rights and responsibilities of

insureds and insurers moving forward under the proposed standard of construing excess
policiesY
Prior scholarship has attempted to clarify the rights and responsibilities of excess insurers
in litigating coverage disputes. 19 John O'Connor's analysis focuses on the issue of who is
responsible for the gap in coverage resulting from a primary insurer's settlement with the insured
for less than the policy limits: the excess insurer, or the insured.'0 O'Connor argues that
requiring the insured to pay the difference is the best solution, as it adequately spreads the risk of
settlement "to the policyholder instead of an excess insurer that is a stranger to the underlying
settlement agreements. "21 In this note I will take a different approach by arguing that, in cases
where the primary insurer settles with the insured for less than the policy limits, excess insurers
should not be liable regardless of who covers the resulting gap in coverage between the

14

629 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 2010). See infra Part liLA.
649 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 2011). See infra Part liLA.
16
See infra Part III.B.
17
See infra Part IV .A.
18
See infra Part V.
19
See John F. O'Connor, Insurance Coverage Settlements and the Rights of Excess Insurers, 62
MD. L. REv. 30 (2003).
20
See id. at 35.
21
Id. at 36.
15

5

settlement amount and the primary policy's limits?2 For our purposes, therefore, O'Connor's
analysis is irrelevant because this note is not concerned with who pays for any existing gap in
coverage. Put simply, the existence of any gap whatsoever should relieve excess insurers of
liability.
More recently, various practitioners have analyzed the issue directly under scrutiny here:
Zeig's role in the construction of excess policies and its current viability?' The consistent theme

seems to be that Zeig's influence is waning. To support their conclusions each author points to
recent decisions from state and federal forums where the courts have refused to adopt Zeig in
interpreting the meaning of excess policies.

However, in this author's view, each fails to

adequately account for the Seventh Circuit's decision in Trinity Homes and the multitude of
courts within the federal circuits that have similarly adopted Zeig essentially as a means of
reading additional terms into the insurance policies in question. Furthermore, the question
analyzed in this article-the disparate applicability of Zeig in the federal courts-is unique from
the more general trends examined in the works mentioned above. For these reasons, this work
breaks new ground and adds a variant perspective to the existing scholarship on the topic.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Second Circuit's Decision in Zeig.

At ftrst glance, the four-paragraph opinion penned by Augustus Hand in Zeig v.
Massachusetts Bonding Ins. Co24 seems to be of little signiftcance.25 However, from these four

paragraphs emerged a doctrine that has come to shape the construction of excess insurance

22

See infra Part IV .A.
See Brewer and Ewing, supra note 5, at 207; Michael F. Aylward, Paying to Play: What Does
it Mean to "Exhaust" Underlying Insurance?, 54 No. 5 DRI FOR DEF 27 (May, 2012).
24
23 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1928)
25
See generally id.
23

6

policies for decades.

The conclusions that Judge Hand posited have had momentous

ramifications for contractual interpretation and continue to play a prominent role in complex
commercial insurance litigation today?6 In trying to understand the present split and the state of
the law within the various federal circuits, it is essential to conduct an examination of Zeig to
grasp the circumstances surrounding and the rationale behind the Second Circuit's public policy
determinations.
The case before the Second Circuit concerned an appeal by the plaintiff Louis Zeig of the
district court's judgment for the defendant, Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Company
("Mass. Bonding"). 27 The initial case came about after a burglary in which Zeig suffered
financial loss? 8 Mass. Bonding had issued an insurance policy to Zeig for the amount of
$5,000?9 However, this policy did not constitute Zeig's primary insurance against the risk of
such loss as Zeig had underlying policies covering up to $15,000.30 The tower structure of
coverage meant that Mass. Bonding's policy was intended, at least from the insurer's
perspective, to cover those costs in excess of the $15,000 of underlying coverage purchased by
Zeig in the case of a burglary or similar fmancial loss.31 The problem arose, as is so often the
case in these disputes, when Zeig settled with his underlying insurers.'2 Rather than demanding,

26

See infra Part III.
Zeig, 23 F.2d at 665.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30
Id. This meant, at least theoretically, that Zeig had $15,000 of coverage to go through before
Mass. Bonding would be on the hook for any of the damages. However, as demonstrated below,
the court's construction of the excess policy issued by Mass. Bonding effectively read out this
protective barrier underlying the Mass. Bonding coverage.
31
23 F.2d at 665. The policy read in relevant part: "As excess and not contributing insurance,
and shall apply and cover only after all other insurance herein referred to shall have been
exhausted in the payment of claims to the full amount of the expressed limits of such other
insurance." Id. (emphasis added).
32 Id.
27

7

and litigating if need be, for the full coverage amount, Zeig settled for a total of $6,000, thus
releasing the underlying insurers from further liability regarding coverage. 33 This created a gap
of $9,000 between the amount actually paid out to Zeig and the amount Mass. Bonding
anticipated being paid out prior to becoming liable. 34 In dismissing the complaint and entering
judgment for the defendant, Mass. Bonding, the district court held, "as a matter of law, that the
policies had not been exhausted in the payment of claims to the full amount of the expressed
limits of such other insurance."35 Zeig appealed the trial court's ruling and the issue was brought
before the Second Circuit.
Judge Hand rejected the defendant's argument and the district court's holding because to
do otherwise, the court opined, would require that the "plaintiff actually

Dcollect the full amount

of the policies for $15,000, in order to 'exhaust' that insurance."36 Hand took the position that,
from a practical point of view, it should make no difference to the excess insurer where the
payment of the resulting gap in coverage, in this case $9,000, comes from. 37 If Zeig paid for the
loss between the settlement amount and the underlying policy limits of $15,000, Mass. Bonding
would be no worse for the wear, "so long as [the defendant] was only called upon to pay such
portion of the loss as was in excess of the limits of those policies."38 This argument has become
one of the most important conclusions used by those courts that have adopted Zeig in subsequent
disputes? 9

'' Id.
34 Id.
35
23 F.2d at 665.
36
Id. at 666.
37
See id.
38 Id.
39
See infra Part III.
8

Additionally, Hand went on to say that "to require an absolute collection of the primary
insurance to its full limit would in many, if not most, cases involve delay, promote litigation, and
prevent an adjustment of disputes which is both convenient and commendable.'"'° Consequently,
the Second Circuit reversed the district court's judgment for Mass. Bonding.

Judge Hand

established that, for the purposes of determining excess insurer liability in similar situations,
"claims are paid to the full amount of the policies, if they are settled and discharged, and the
primary insurance is thereby exhausted.'"'1 With this decision, Judge Hand and the Second
Circuit established an ambitious new doctrine governing the judicial construction of excess
insurance contracts that has served as a justification for subsequent courts to essentially read in
terms more favorable to insureds, even if the insureds did not specifically contract for these

B.

Zeig's Place as Common Law Doctrine Operating Independently of State Contract
Law.
Zeig was decided in 1928, before the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Erie RR. v.

Tompkins, 43 which established the principle that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply
state law. 44 Before Erie, federal courts were able to employ the "federal common law" in
resolving disputes rooted in state substantive law.45 What this means for understanding Zeig is

40

23 F .2d at 666.
Id.
See infra Part II.B. See, e.g., Wm. C. Vick Const. Co., 52 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
For a more thorough discussion of interpreting policy ambiguity against the insurer see generally
Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REv.
961 (1970).
43
304 u.s. 64 (1938).
44
See id. at 78.
45
Id. at 71 ("Swift v. Tyson [] held that federal courts exercising jurisdiction on the ground of
diversity of citizenship need not, in matters of general jurisprudence, apply the unwritten law of
the State as declared by its highest court; that they are free to exercise an independent judgment
as to what the common law of the State is- or should be.").
4t
42

9

that, although the basis for Zeig's complaint undoubtedly resided in state law, Judge Hand was
free to establish an overarching policy argument which shaped and ultimately defmed the Second
Circuit's construction of excess insurance policies and the concept of exhaustion. 46 Even more
fundamental to understanding the present state of insurance jurisprudence in the circuit courts is
the fact that, despite Erie's rejection of federal common law principles, Zeig's conclusions have
survived and continue to inform the judicial construction of insurance policies.47
Given its foundations in contract law, insurance disputes are governed by state, rather
than federal law. Therefore, a federal court sitting in diversity on a dispute between insured and
insurer, whether regarding primary or excess coverage, is bound to apply the relevant state law
governing the construction of insurance policies and contracts more generally. 48 The primary
issue often determined by the individual state's law is any finding of ambiguity, and how the
court should construe the policy upon the finding of such ambiguity .49 However, while state law
does control in federal diversity disputes, an analysis of the case law demonstrates that, in
addition to and independently of state law, the federal courts have repeatedly grappled with the
conclusions set forth by Judge Hand in Zeig50 The courts and the parties litigating excess
coverage disputes have had to confront Zeig and its implications in the interpretation of policies.
This demonstrates that the principle of public policy considerations overriding the language of
insurance contracts established by Zeig has continued to be a major factor in the federal courts. 51

46

See Zeig, 23 F.2d at 666.
See infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
48
See infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
49
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
50
See infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
51
See infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
47

10

In Koppers Co.. Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 52 the Third Circuit, applying
Pennsylvania law, was tasked with deciding whether an insured could pursue a claim against its
excess insurer despite the fact that the insured had settled with the primary insurer for less than
the full policy amount. 53 Because Pennsylvania's highest court had yet to rule on the issue, the
court in Koppers was provided little substantive guidance as to what the relevant state law
actually was. 54 Noting "the absence of guidance from the state's highest court," ultimately the
court held that:
[t]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt the widely-followed rule that the
policyholder may recover on the excess policy for a proven loss to the extent it
exceed the primary policy's limits ... [and that] settlement with the primary insurer
functionally exhausts primary coverage and therefore triggers the excess
policy ."55
In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit did not provide any substantive Pennsylvania law
that supported the proposition that a settlement for less than the full policy amount could
properly exhaust the underlying policy. 56 The court cited only to the Federal District Court for
the District of Delaware's decision in Stargatt v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. / 7 where that court,
applying Delaware law, utilized the same analytical framework to predict what Delaware law
would say on the issue. 58

52

98 F .3d 1440 (3d Cir. 1996).
See id. at 1445.
54
See id.
55
Id. at 1445, 1454 (internal quotations omitted).
56
See id. To date, no Pennsylvania court has directly taken up the issue of Zeig and its
applicability in excess insurance disputes.
57
67 F.R.D. 689 (D. Del. 1975).
58
See id. 690. However, the court in Stargatt noted that there was no controlling Delaware
ruling on the issue, and therefore applied the federal common law in resolving the dispute. See
id. at 690-91 ("Neither of the parties, nor the Court, has found any Delaware authority, which
would be controlling on this question. However, the Second Circuit, ruling as a matter of
general common law in the pre-Erie-Tompkins era, answered this argument in a case on all fours
with this one ... I believe the reasoning of the Zeig case was correct and am confident that the
53

11

Both of these cases demonstrate that courts are willing to rely on the doctrinal
conclusions proffered by Judge Hand in Zeig as a means of redefining "exhaustion" in excess
insurance policies, regardless of the fact that the state law in question is often not yet determined.
Other federal courts have used this model of analysis as a means of adopting Zeig and therefore
broadly defming exhaustion of primary policies. 59 Even in instances where courts have refused
to adopt Zeig and use public policy concerns to override strict contractual interpretation, many
insureds have relied extensively on Judge Hand's conclusions in arguing for a broad definition of
exhaustion. 60 As the cases demonstrate, whether or not the courts are amenable to Zeig's

Delaware courts would reach the same result in this case."). To date, Delaware law has not been
definitively settled regarding Zeig. However, in a recent decision the Delaware Supreme Court,
applying California law, refused to apply Zeig's policy arguments as a means of altering an
excess insurance policy to allow for exhaustion where the insured had settled with underlying
insurers for less than the full policy amount. See Intel Corp. v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co.,
51 A.3d 442, 450 (Del. 2012) ("We find Zeig inapplicable here as well: the plain language of the
f<olicy controls.").
9
See Trinity Homes LLC v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 629 F.3d 653, 659 (7th Cir. 2010) ("While the
parties have not put forth any Indiana precedent directly on point, our sister circuits have dealt
with similar umbrella policies, and their holdings lend further support [cites Zeig and the Third
Circuit's ruling in Koppers]. Although Indiana law controls, there is no reason to suspect it
would differ from these analogous holdings."); Maximus, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 1:11 cv
1231, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32970 (E.D. Va. March 12, 2012) ("[I]n light of well-established
principles of insurance contract interpretation and the substantial policy considerations
articulated by Zeig and its progeny, [plaintiffs] settlements with the underlying insurers for less
than the full limits of their respective policies and agreeing to fill the gap so that the policy limits
have been reached satisfies the exhaustion requirement.").
60
See Citigroup Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 649 F.3d 367, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) ("Citigroup urges us to
apply the rule established in Zeig."); Federal Ins. Co. v. Srivistava, 2 F.3d 98, 102 (5th Cir. 1992)
("Appellants rely upon a sixty-five-year [old] Second Circuit decision, holding that actual
payment of underlying policies is not required in order to exhaust them and trigger excess
coverage."); Comerica Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1029 (E.D. Mich.
2007) ("[Plaintifi] insists that its own payment of $6 million toward settlement filled the gap
between [the underlying insurer's) payment and the balance of the policy limit ... (t]he foundation
of its argument is Zeig."); Wright v. Newman, 598 F. Supp. 1178, 1197 (W.D. Mo. 1984)
("Beyond all this there is, as plaintiffs pointed out ... an argument that policy provisions such as
those involved here may, in effect, be ignored upon the theory than an excess insurer has no
rational interest in whether the insured collected the full amount of the primary policies, so long
12

reasoning, the public policy conclusions put forth by Judge Hand continue to be in play in
insurance litigation in the federal courts.

Part ill. THE CURRENT SPLIT ON ZEIG WITHIN THE CffiCUlT COURTS AND
THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AT STAKE
A.

Divergent Application of Zeig in Defining "Exhaustion" in the Construction of
Excess Insurance Policies.
While different circuits have dealt with the issue of adopting Zeig's policy

considerations, an analysis of two recent decisions adequately clarifies the present split. The
Seventh Circuit's adoption of Zeig in Trinity Homes LLC v. Ohio Cas. Inc. Co. 61 and the Fifth
Circuit's rejection in Citigroup, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co. 62 are optimal lenses through which to
examine Zeig's current viability. Both of these cases are recently decided and provide insight
into the continuing dispute over how best to construe excess insurance policies. Additionally,
they clearly and concisely present the two opposing schools of thought when it comes to
contractual interpretation within the context of complex insurance disputes.63
In Trinity Homes, the Seventh Circuit reviewed a suit brought by general contractors
against their primary and excess insurers alleging breach of contract and seeking a declaration
that both insurers had a duty to provide coverage. 64 The plaintiff had settled with most of its
primary insurers, but one, Ohio Casualty Insurance Company ("Ohio"), refused to do so. 65
Cincinnati Insurance Company ("Cincinnati"), which provided excess coverage, piggybacked on

as [the excess insurer] was only called upon to pay such a portion of the loss as was in excess of
those policies.") (citing Zeig, 23 F.3d at 666).
61 629 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 2010).
62 649 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 2011).
63
See infra.
64
See Trinity Homes, 629 F.3d at 655.
65
See id.
13

Ohio's refusal to settle and argued that it was not liable because all underlying insurance had yet
to be exhausted. 66 Cincinnati also relied on the fact that not all of Trinity Homes' settlements
with the underlying insurers were for the full policy amount.67 The Cincinnati policy at issue in
the case defmed the parameters of excess liability as:
(a) if the limits of underlying insurance have been reduced by payments of claims,
this policy will continue in force as excess of the reduced underlying insurance,
[or] (b) [i]f the limits of underlying insurance have been exhausted by payment of
claims, this policy will continue in force as underlying insurance.68
The district court found that all relevant underlying policies had not been exhausted,
thereby releasing Cincinnati from liability. 69 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed. The
Cincinnati policy did not clearly require exhaustion by insurer payout alone. 70 As the court put
it, "[t]he umbrella policy is clear only insofar as it requires that the underlying CGL coverage be
unavailable--either by exhaustion or denial of coverage before Cincinnati's coverage is
triggered."71 The court seized upon this finding of ambiguity to hold that the underlying policies
were functionally exhausted by the settlement agreements between the primary insurers and
Trinity Homes. 72

66

See id.
Each of the settling primary insurers had settled for at least seventy-five percent of the policy
limits. See id.
68
629 F.3d at 658. The policy defined "underlying insurance" as "the policies of the insurance
listed in the Schedule of underlying Policies and the insurance available to the insured under all
other insurance policies applicable to the occurrence [of the loss]." Id. (emphasis added)
(internal quotations omitted).
69
See id.
70
See id.
71 Id.
72
629 F.3d at 658-9. The court noted that neither party had "put forth any Indiana precedent
directly on point." Id. at 659. Consequently, the court relied in large part upon Hand's analysis
in Zeig. Id. (citing Zeig, 23 F.2d at 666). The court also pointed to the Third Circuit's decision
in Koppers to underscore its conclusion that public policy considerations in favor of out of court
settlement of disputes permitted to functional exhaustion of primary policies, even when the
insured had settled for less than the policy limits. See id. (citing Koppers, 98 F.3d at 1454)
67

14

One might argue that, taken individually, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Trinity Homes
merely constitutes a deviation from the developing trend in the law towards reining in Zeig's
influence on excess insurance disputes.73 This argument, however, fails to account for the fact
that other circuit and district courts have come to the same conclusion in adopting Zeig?4 While
numerous circuits have used the Trinity Homes approach, it is by no means ubiquitous and
represents only one of the approaches currently employed by federal courts addressing Zeig' s
role in defming exhaustion within the context of complex commercial insurance disputes.
In its recent decision in Citigroup, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals took the
diametrically opposite stance in resolving a similar dispute between insured and excess insurer.

75

In that case, the court reviewed a case brought by Citigroup against a number of excess insurers
who had denied coverage based upon Citigroup's failure to properly exhaust its underlying

("[S]ettlement with the primary insurer functionally exhausts primary coverage and therefore
triggers the excess policy-though by settling the policyholder loses any right to coverage of the
difference between the settlement amount and the primary policy's limits.") (internal quotations
omitted). The court concluded by stating that "[a]lthough Indiana law controls, there is no
reason to suspect that it would differ from these analogous holdings." Id. To date, no Indiana
court has explicitly addressed Zeig and its application to excess coverage disputes.
73
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
74
The Third Circuit has, as previously noted, followed Zeig on multiple occasions. See
generally Koppers Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440 (3d Cir. 1996); Stargatt v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 67 F.R.D. 689 (D. Del. 1975), affd 758 F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1978).
Likewise, courts within the Fourth Circuit have adopted a pro-Zeig stance. See generally,
Maximus, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 1:11 cv 1231,2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32970 (E.D. Va.
March 12, 2012). For application of Zeig within the Eighth Circuit see Reliance Ins Co. in
Liquidation v. Chitwood, 433 F.3d 660, 664 (8th Cir. 2006); Archer Daniels Midland v. Aon
Risk Services, Inc. of Minnesota, No. Civ. 97-2185JRTRLE, 1999 WL 34818933 at *5 (D.
Minn. Feb. 25, 1999), affd 356 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2004). For the Tenth Circuit see Coffeyville
Res. Ref. Mktg., LLC v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 714 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1131 (D. Kan. 2010).
Finally, Zeig is still considered good law within the Second Circuit. See Lexington Ins. Co. v.
Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Ins. Co., 11 Civ. 391, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59635 (S.D.N.Y.
March 28, 2012) ([Zeig] continues to be the seminal decision interpreting New York insurance
law in this Circuit.") (emphasis added). However, there is currently a case before the Second
Circuit that implicates the Zeig doctrine. See Federal Ins. Co. v. Mehdi Ali, The Estate of
Alexander M. Haig, No. 11-5000, 2012 U.S. 2nd Cir. Briefs LEXIS 44 at *3-4 (2d Cir. 2012).
75
See generally Citigroup, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 649 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 2011).
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policies when it settled with primary insurers for less than the full policy limits 76 Associates
First Capital Corp. ("Associates"), a nationwide consumer lender, had purchased integrated risk
policies from ten insurers, providing a total of $200 million in coverage. 77 Associates' primary
policy was issued by Lloyd's of London ("Lloyd's") and covered the initial $50 million ofloss. 78
Associates then went on to purchase excess policies from an additional nine insurers?9
Following its acquisition of Associates in November of 2000, Citigroup brought a
declaratory judgment action in state court concerning coverage for two underlying actions
against Associates; a statewide class action filed in California and a Federal Trade Commission
suit alleging that Associates had violated federal truth in lending statutes. 80 While Citigroup did
notifY its insurers of the pending litigation against it in connection with its acquisition of
Associates, Citigroup later settled these actions for $240 million plus $23 million in class
counsel's fees and costs, without obtaining the consent of the carriers. 81 After the defendant-

76

See id. at 370.
Id.
78
Id. at 369.
79
649 F.3d at 369. The structure of the tower of coverage was as follows:
• National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh provided $25 million of
coverage in excess of Lloyd's policy.
• Starr Excess Liability Insurance International, Ltd.'s additional $25 million
constituted the "Secondary Layer" of excess coverage.
• The third layer, or "Quota Share Layer," provided an additional $100 million of
coverage and was spread among seven different insurers: Ace Bermuda Insurance,
Ltd., $25 million; Federal Insurance Company, $17 million; Chubb Atlantic
Indemnity, $17 million; Twin City Insurance Company, $17 million; St. Paul
Mercury Insurance Company, $10 million; Steadfast Insurance Company, $9 million;
SR International Business Insurance Company, $5 million. Id.
8o Id.
81
Id. at 370 (emphasis added). See infra Part III.B. for a discussioJil of the policy considerations
implicated by Citigroup's decision to unilaterally settle these underlying suits without consulting
its insurers, and then turning around and demanding coverage for the losses incurred.
77
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excess insurers removed the case to federal court, Citigroup settled with its primary insurer,
Lloyd's, for $15 million. 82
The excess insurers subsequently denied coverage, arguing that Citigroup's settlement
with Lloyd's had failed to properly exhaust the underlying insurance. 83 At trial and before the
Fifth Circuit, Citigroup relied extensively on Zeig to argue that the court should fmd, despite the
substantial gap between the settlement amount and the Lloyd's policy limits, that Citigroup had
functionally exhausted its primary coverage and could therefore access the roughly $150 million
in excess coverage under the additional policies. 84 One can't help but appreciate the way in
which the facts of the Citigroup case so clearly illuminate the stakes for each of the parties
involved in these disputes.

By gambling on the fact that the court would approve of its

settlement with Lloyd's and allow it to tap into its excess policies, Citigroup was opening itself
up to the significant possibility that it would personally have to cover over $200 million of its
settlement with the class in California and the FTC regarding its violation of federal law. 85
Citigroup relied on this approach despite the fact that neither the Texas Supreme Court nor the
82

Id. Under the terms of its policy with Lloyd's, Associates had purchased no less than $50
million in primary coverage. See id.
83
649 F.3d at 369. The relevant policies for the four excess insurers stated that excess coverage
attached only:
• Federal Insurance Company-when "(a) all Underlying Insurance carriers have paid in
cash the full amount of their respective liabilities, [and] (b) the full amount of the
Underlying Insurance policies have been collected by plaintiffs";
• St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company-when "the total amount of the Underlying Limit
of Liability has been paid in legal currency by the insurers of the Underlying Insurance as
covered loss thereunder";
• Starr Excess Liability Insurance International, Ltd.-when "any Insurer subscribing to
any Underlying Policy shall have agreed to pay or have been liable to pay the full amount
of its respective limits ofliability"; and
• Steadfast Insurance Company-"in the event of the exhaustion of all of the limit(s) of
such 'Underlying Insurance' solely as a result of payment of loss thereunder." Id. at 37273.
84
Id. at 371-372.
ss See id.
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Fifth Circuit sitting in diversity applying Texas law had ever adopted Zeig in interpreting the
meaning of excess insurance policies. 86 Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit rejected Citigroup's
argument and held that "the plain language of the policies dictate that the primary insurer pays
the full amount of its limits of liability before excess coverage is triggered."87 Other federal
courts have followed a similar analysis in rejection plaintiff-insureds' arguments for adopting

Zeig and broadly construing the definition of exhaustion.S 8

B.

The Policy Implications at Issue Under Both Approaches.
As demonstrated in the previous section, the federal circuits are split on the proper role of

Zeig in informing the judicial construction of excess insurance policies.S9 This split creates
significant problems of symmetry and ultimately requires a definitive resolution of the issue that
will provide guidance for both future insureds and insurers and consistency within the legal
system. 90 However, this cannot be the end of the inquiry. 91 The unique problem of interpreting
excess insurance policies and the historical role of Zeig in courts' attempts to do so present
substantial questions of public policy for both camps. The resolution of these competing policy
concerns is by no means clear-cut and exposes the high stakes involved in the resolution of
complex commercial insurance litigation.

1.

The Pro-Zeig Argument

86

Id. See, e.g., Federal Ins. Co. v. Srivastava, 2 F.3d 98, 103 (5th Cir. 1993).
649 F.3d at 372.
as See Comerica Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1029 (E.D. Mich. 2007);
Wright b. Newman, 598 F. Supp. 1178, 1197 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
89
See supra Part liLA.
90
Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting off the Formal for the
Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1038 (1991) (concluding that in insurance disputes, "it is not
enough to know the law of insurance ... [o]ne must also know the judge.")
91
See infra Part IV.A.
87
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The argument in favor of utilizing Zeig as a means of broadly defining exhaustion and
therefore permitting insureds to access excess insurance in the event of a settlement with the
primary insurer for less than the policy's limits is centered on the notion that it is generally a
good thing for parties to resolve their disputes on their own. 92 These considerations were, of
course, clearly and concisely laid out by Judge Hand in his opinion nearly a century ago?3 In
resolving the dispute over Zeig' s attempt to access the coverage provided by the excess policy
with Mass. Bonding, Judge Hand first noted that "the defendant [insurer] had no rational interest
in whether the insured collected the full amount of the primary policies," so long as that
defendant-insurer was called upon only to pay for those losses in excess of the primary policy's
full limits. 94 Numerous courts have seized upon Hand's contention that allowing functional
exhaustion in such cases does not disadvantage insurers in any practical sense in justifying their
decision to adopt Ze ig and permit the insured to access excess coverage despite having settled for
below-policy-limit amounts. 95
In addition to the "no worse for the wear" argument, Judge Hand went further in arguing

a more far-reaching justification for the court's ruling in Zeig. "To require an absolute collection
of the primary insurance to its full limit," the court held, "would in many, if not most, cases
involve delay, promote litigation, and prevent an adjustment of disputes which is both

92

See Zeig, 23 F .2d at 666.
See id.
94 ld.
95
See Trinity Homes, 629 F .3d at 659 ("Moreover, this construction of the policy neither has a
punitive effect on Cincinnati nor does it alter its underwriting considerations. [Insured] is not
asking Cincinnati to drop down and pay the remainder of the [primary] limits after its settlement
with the [primary] insurers ... [the insured] has paid the remainder of the [primary] limits itself.");
Koppers, 98 F.3d at 1454 ("The excess insurer cannot be made liable for any part of this
difference because the excess insurer never agreed to pay for losses below a specified floor.").
93
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convenient and commendable."96 Unsurprisingly, this statement has become the linchpin for
courts in adopting Zeig and broadly defining exhaustion to the benefit of the insured in many
disputes. 97 Taken together, these two conclusions posited by the Second Circuit in Zeig have
proven to be persuasive to many judges over the years. These arguments are not without merit,
and undoubtedly deserve serious consideration in resolving the asymmetrical state of the law as
its presently stands. However, Hand's opinion only addresses half of the policy implications to
be considered.

2.

The Anti-Zeig Argument

In reality the policy analysis required to fully understand the dilemma presented by Zeig

is not so one-sided an exercise. 98 What Judge Hand, and subsequent courts adopting Zeig, failed
to comprehend is that there are in fact significant repercussions for excess insurers in so broadly
defming exhaustion and rendering excess insurers liable in cases where the insured has settled
with the primary insurers for below-the-limit amounts. To properly demonstrate the interests of
excess insurers in narrowly reading the policy's meaning through the language of the policy
itself, one must first look at the economics of issuing excess insurance policies.

96

Zeig, 23 F.3d at 666.
See Trinity Homes, 629 F.3d at 659 ("Rather than agree to a lower payout by a [primary]
insurer as part of a settlement, an insured with an excess policy would be forced to fully litigate
each and every one of its [primary] policy claims before seeking recourse from its umbrella
insurer."); Koppers, 98 F .3d at 1454 ("Courts have adopted this rule because it encourages
settlement and allows the insured to obtain the benefit of its bargain with the excess insurer,
while at the same time preventing the insured from obtaining a double recovery.")
98
See Zeig, 23 F.2d at 666 ("We can see no reason for a construction so burdensome to the
insured.")
97
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Generally speaking, the cost to the insured for obtaining excess coverage is considerably
less than for primary coverage. 99 One reason for this is that "insureds need to turn to their
policies less often than those of underlying insurers meaning that they will generally only
respond in the event of catastrophic losses, or, in limited circumstances."100 More importantly,
the excess insurer assumes "that the claims that penetrate the excess layer will already have been
processed through the underlying layers." 101
As Michael Aylward notes, what this process is theoretically intended to guarantee is that
any claim that reaches the excess level has been adequately scrutinized by the primary insurer
and therefore merits coverage. 102 If courts permit an insured to access excess coverage without
availing itself of the procedural devices negotiated for with the excess insurer, they have
functionally permitted "an insured [to] tender a large liability loss to its high-level excess
insurers without the claims first being vetted both for liability and damages as well as for
insurance coverage." 103 This deprives the excess insurers the benefit of its bargain with the
insured. 104

99

See Aylward, supra note 23, at 35.
Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
1o3 Id.
104
Aylward, supra note 23, at 35. See also Brewer and Ewing, supra note 5, at 210 ("[U]pper
level insurers price the coverage based on not having to deal with less-than legitimate claims, as
these should never make it past the level of the Primary Policy.").
100

Numerous courts have noted the disadvantage that excess insurers face if less-than-limit
settlements are permitted to trigger excess coverage. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lay, 577 F.2d 421,
423 (7th Cir. 1978) ("A settlement for less than the primary limit that imposed liability on the
excess carrier would remove the incentive of the primary insurer to defend in good faith or to
discharge its duty to represent the interests of the excess carrier.") (citation omitted); Comerica
Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co. 498 F. Supp.2d 1019, 1032 (E.D. Mich. 2007) ("[Insured] had a
fundamental disagreement with its primary insurer as to whether [that primary insurer] was liable
for any amount of the settlement. That dispute did not directly involve [the excess insurer], and
21

In addition to the inequitable treatment of excess insurers under such a doctrine, there are
more practical, far-reaching reasons for rejecting Zeig and more narrowly construing excess
policies.

Should the Zeig model prevail, what will inevitably follow will be a drastic

recalculation of the risks involved in the issuance of excess insurance contracts.

This

recalculation will ultimately lead to increased rates for excess coverage across the board 105 In
his article The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 106 George L. Priest examines the
possible causes of the insurance crisis of the mid-1980s and goes to great lengths to illuminate
the incentives and calculations of insureds and insurers from a systemic perspective. Central to
Priest's analysis is the fact that in order to maintain economic viability, insurers must attract
customers with a sufficiently "low range of exposure to risk for the insurance to remain
fmancially attractive to each [policy purchaser]."107 When increased exposure to risk occurs, for
whatever reason, the insurer is then forced to adjust the premiums paid by all participants
accordingly. In this situation, "low-risk [insureds] pay a premium that, because it is based on an
average which includes high-risk [insureds]," is more than they would have to pay if isolated
from the higher-risk policyholders. 108 If the financial burden on low-risk insureds becomes too
substantial, those policyholders may opt "to drop out of the pool because they find alternative
means of protection cheaper than market insurance."

109

[the insured] did not have the right to tie [the excess insurer] to any aspect of its settlement with
[the primary] without [the excess') consent."); Wright v. Newman, 598 F. Supp. 1178, 1197
(W.D. Mo. 1984) ("[T]o ignore the policy provisions in question would effectively deprive
[insurer] the material benefit for which it implicitly bargained when it undertook the risk of
excess coverage.") (citation omitted).
105
See Brewer and Ewing, supra note 5, at 215.
106
George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521
(1987).
107
Id. at 1541.
108
Id.
!09 Id.
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Further complicating this already troubling scenario is the fact that "as low-risk
[insureds] drop out, a pool will consist more predominantly of high-risk members, requiring the
premium to be raised and placing greater pressure on the remaining low-risk members of the
pool." 110 What this means in the context of excess insurance coverage is that, should excess
insurers' potential exposure increase through permitting functional exhaustion of primary
policies through settlement for less-than-policy-limits amounts, the subsequent rise in premiums
could make those interested in purchasing excess coverage opt for other means of protecting
themselves financially, if at all.

Such a result would harm not only insurers, but also all

commercial entities seeking an economically viable means of protecting themselves against the
risk of catastrophic loss. 111

Part IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNIFORMITY: UNIVERSAL REJECTION OF
ZEIG AND A RETURN TO A FOUR-CORNERS APPROACH TO POLICY
INTERPRETATION

As Part III of this note demonstrates, the present state of the law as it concerns Zeig' s
viability in the federal circuits is inconsistent at best, arbitrary at worst. The lack of clarity and
predictability across the circuits has potentially detrimental consequences for those engaged in
the insurance markets, both purchaser and provider, and those seeking to litigate coverage
claims, both insured and insurer. 112 In order to resolve this problematic status quo the federal
courts must adopt a uniform position regarding the exhaustion of primary policies and Zeig's
conclusions regarding public policy and functional exhaustion through settlements for less-thanpolicy-limits amounts.

110
111

Id.

See infra Part IV .B.
112
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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In doing so, the circuits should adopt the position enunciated by the court in Citigroup,
where the Fifth Circuit rejected the insured's argument that settling with its primary insurer for
$15 million of a $50 million policy properly exhausted that policy and therefore exposed the
excess insurers to liability. 113 In Citigroup, the court unequivocally found Zeig inapplicable and
refused to employ Judge Hand's public policy analysis as a means of getting around the clear
meaning of the policy's language. The federal circuits should adopt Citigroup as the standard for
analyzing excess policies because the Seventh Circuit's decision in Trinity Homes wrongly
trivialized the consequences for excess insurers under the Zeig approach and failed to apply clear
Seventh Circuit precedent in reaching its holding. Additionally, the public policy considerations
at stake favor the stricter contractual interpretation of insurance policies undertaken by the Fifth
Circuit in Citigroup and those jurisdictions that have rejected Zeig.

A.

In Trinity Homes the Seventh Circuit failed to apply clear precedent and
mischaracterized the policy considerations at stake.
In Trinity Homes, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary

judgment to the excess insurer Cincinnati, holding that the insured's settlement with the primary
insurer for roughly seventy-five percent of the primary policy's limits constituted exhaustion and
therefore rendered Cincinnati liable for the damages exceeding the primary policy's limits.ll 4 In
addition to citing to Zeig for support of its holding, the court stated that "this construction of the
policy neither has a punitive effect on Cincinnati nor does it alter its underwriting
considerations." 115 This assertion echoed the position taken by Judge Hand in Zeig, where he
posited that "the defendant had no rational interest in whether the insured collected the full
amount of the primary policies, so long as it was only called upon to pay such portion of the loss
113

Citigroup, 649 F.3d at 372.
Trinity Homes, 629 F.3d at 660.
liS Id. at 659.

1!

4
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as was in excess of the limits of those policies."116 What both Judge Hand and the Seventh
Circuit failed to grasp is that, despite their confident assertions to the contrary, excess insurers do
have a tangible interest in the disposition of an insured's claim against its primary insurer, and
any settlement between the insured and primary insurer can have substantial consequences for
those located higher up the ladder of coverage.
As previously described above, excess insurers operate under the assumption that
potential claims over coverage will be tested and analyzed for merit at the primary level, so that
any "claims that penetrate the excess layer will already have been processed through the
underlying layers." 117 Therefore, from the excess insurer's perspective, a settlement between the
primary and the insured, especially for significantly less than the policy limit, removes the
structural protections against umneritorious claims. This potential for exposure to claims that
were not properly scrutinized at the primary level firmly demonstrates that excess insurers do
have an interest in the outcome of any settlement discussion between the primary insurer and the
insured.U 8

Furthermore, it frustrates traditional notions of contract interpretation to hold, as

Zeig and Trinity Homes do, that an excess insurer may be bound by an agreement between
independent parties that is outside the scope of its policy with the insured. 119 What all of these

116

Zeig, 23 F.2d at 666.
See Aylward, supra note 23, at 35.
118
See Wright v. Newman, 598 F. Supp. 1178, 1197 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (fmding that the excess
insurer "has, in these circumstances, a compelling interest in enforcing the policy provisions in
question") (internal quotations omitted). In Wright v. Newman, the court further stated that "to
ignore policy provisions in question would effectively deprive [the excess insurer] of a material
benefit for which it implicitly bargained when it undertook coverage." Id. Consequently, the
court held that a settlement for less than the primary policy limit failed to exhaust the policy and
trigger excess coverage. Id.
119
In Comerica Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (E.D. Mich. 2007), the
court noted that although the insured's settlement with claimant securities litigation plaintiffs
"potentially implicated [the excess insurer] Zurich's excess policy because the settlement amount
exceed the primary insurance coverage," the settlement between the insured and its primary
117
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considerations highlight is the fact that, regardless of the circumstances, excess insurer's do have
a strong interest in the outcome of disputes between insured and primary insurer, especially
pertaining to possible settlement agreements. 120
In addition to its erroneous dismissal of the potential harm to excess insurers under Zeig,
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Trinity Homes is fatally flawed because it failed to either adhere
to binding precedent. In US. Fire Ins. Co. v. LllJI, 121 the Seventh Circuit heard another case
involving the proper standard for exhaustion of primary policies in order to expose excess
insurers to coverage liability .122 In that case, the primary insurer had negotiated a settlement
with the injured claimant before the claimant brought the anticipated suit for wrongful death. 123
When U.S. Fire Insurance Company ("U.S. Fire") brought a declaratory judgment action against
the administratrix of the decedent's estate seeking a declaration that it was not liable for any
damages, the claimant relied on Zeig to argue that U.S. Fire was liable for coverage in excess of

insurer had no such binding effect on Zurich. See id. at 1032. As the court put it, the insured
"had a fundamental dispute with its primary insurer as to whether [the primary] was liable for
any amount of the settlement." Id.
"That dispute did not directly involve Zurich, and [the insured] did not have the right to
tie Zurich to any aspect of its settlement with [the primary] without Zurich's consent." Id. The
court was not moved by the insured's arguments, finding that the insured sought "the certainty
that its settlement brought and the benefit of coverage from its excess carrier as if it had won its
dispute with the primary insurer ... [n]o public policy argument says that [the insured] may have
its cake and eat it too." ld.
120
Permitting under the limit settlements, as endorsed by Zeig, would radically and irrevocably
alter the thought process of excess insurance underwriters. As so aptly put by Lee Brewer and
Barbara Ewing, the question, from the insurer's point of view, in issuing new policies would go
from, "[h]ow often will a loss realistically valued at more than $10 million occur?" to something
more along the lines of, "[h]ow often will the underlying policy carrier settle the claim, and the
insured seek to recover for its additional claims under the excess policy?" Brewer and Ewing,
supra note 5, at 224.
12
577 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1978).
122
In Lll)l the settlements in question were between a third-party personal injury claimant and the
insured and primary carrier for less than the limits of the primary policy. See id. at 421.
123
Id. at 422.
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the limits of the primary policy. 124 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that
U.S. Fire was not liable. 125 Although the outcome of the case did not hinge on a Zeig
determination because of the procedural peculiarities, the court nonetheless went on to say that
"[w]e can conceive of good reasons for an excess carrier to be unwilling to accept liability unless
the amount of the primary policy has actually been paid." 126 "A settlement for less than the
primary limit that imposed liability on the excess carrier would remove the incentive of the
primary insurer to defend in good faith or to discharge its duty to represent the interests of the
excess carrier." 127

In Premcor USA, Inc. v. American Home Assur. Co. 128 the plaintiff, Premcor USA, Inc.
("Premcor''), relied on Zeig in arguing that its excess insurers were obligated to cover its losses
emanating from two underlying tort actions, regardless of the fact that Premcor had settled with
its primary insurer for less than the policy limits. 129 The court granted the excess insurer's
motion forsummary judgment because "Zeig's holding that exhaustion of the primary policies'
payments does not require collection of the primary policies as a condition precedent to the right
to recover excess insurance is contrary to Seventh Circuit precedent." 130 In Zurich, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment on the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff, Zurich. 131
Zurich brought a declaratory judgment action against the insured seeking a determination that

124

See id. at 423.
See id. The court reasoned that because the settlement between the insured and primary and
the claimant occurred before any suit for damages was brought, the excess carrier was in fact at
no point liable under the terms of the excess policy. See id.
126
577 F.2d at 423.
121 Id.
128 No. 03 C 7377, 2004 WL 1152847 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2004).
129 Id. at *8.
13o Id. (internal quotations omitted){citing New Process Baking Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 923 F.3d
62, 63 (7th Cir. 1991); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Heil Co., 815 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 1987).
131 Zurich Ins. Co., 815 F.2d at 1122.
125
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Zurich was not required to "drop-down" to cover the insured's loss as a result of the primary
insurer's insolvency. 132 Rejecting the plaintiff's claim of functional exhaustion, the Seventh
Circuit opined: "Zurich did not contract to bear the risk of the primary carrier's insolvency, nor
do its premiums reflect the cost that the assumption of this risk would entail... an excess liability
insurer does not anticipate such a burden." 133
The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed this principle four years later in New Process, where the
insured brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to determine the scope of its excess policy
with Federal Insurance Company ("Federal"). 134 Affirming the district court's grant of summary
judgment to Federal, the Seventh Circuit held that "[e]xhaustion does not occur until the
underlying insurance limits have been met through payment." 135 It is true that the specific
factual parameters of New Process and Zurich are not directly on point with Trinity Homes and
the other cases addressed here. In New Process and Zurich the analysis centered on whether or
not the excess insurer was required to "drop-down" and fill the shoes of an insolvent primary
insurer. 136 However, what each unequivocally illuminates for the purposes of this note is that, as
put so aptly by the court in Premcor, Zeig' s policy conclusions are contrary to existing law
within the Seventh Circuit. 137
In Trinity Homes, Cincinnati relied on the Seventh Circuit's proclamations in Lay in
arguing that it could not be held liable for coverage. In deciding the case the district court

Id. See also infra note 8.
Id. at 1126. The court went further, stating that "secondary coverage is coverage whereby,
under the terms of the policy, liability attaches only after a predetermined amount of primary
coverage has been exhausted ... [t]his reduced risk is reflected in the cost of the policy." Id.
(citing Continental Marble & Granite v. Canal Ins. Co., 785 F.2d 1258, 1259 (5th Cir. 1986).
134 See New Process, 923 F.2d at 62.
135 Id. at 63 (citing Zurich, 815 F.2d at 1126).
136 See infra notes 8, 132 and accompanying text.
137 Premcor, 2004 WL 1152847, at *8.
132
133
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addressed Lay's status as authority on the issue. 138 The court noted that, "although its reasoning
applies in part, Lay is not entirely [determinative]" because of the involvement in Lay of the
claimant in the settlement agreement. 139 Despite the distinguishing fact that the settlement in
Lay involved a third-party claimant, the district court's purposeful critique of Zeig' s conclusions

was an accurate reflection of existing law within the circuit. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
wrongly reversed the district court's holding that the policy was not exhausted and endorsed
Zeig. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit addressed neither Cincinnati's reliance on Lay or the

district court's discussion of the case. 140 This failure to do so amounted to a strategic side-step
around clear precedent which was unfavorable to Zeig and the court of appeals' desired ends in
Trinity Homes. For these reasons, the decision is fatally flawed. Courts should therefore reject
Trinity Homes' conclusions in adjudicating questions of exhaustion in excess coverage disputes.

B.

The Totality ofthe Public Policy Considerations Favor Endorsing the Fifth Circuit's
Rejection of Zeig.
In addition to the legally questionable nature of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Trinity

Homes to maneuver around its prior decision in Lay, the totality of the policy considerations at

stake favor endorsing the Fifth Circuit's rejection of Zeig. Adopting such an approach to policy
interpretation would both provide excess insurers with the benefit of their bargain with the
insured and help to ensure the continued relatively lower cost of maintaining excess insurance
for commercial entities to help protect against the risk of catastrophic loss.
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See Trinity Homes LLC v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., No. 1:04-cv-1920-SEB-DML, 2009 WL
3163108, at *11 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 25, 2009).
139
Id. Despite this, the district court still found for Cincinnati and ruled that the primary policy
had not been exhausted. Id.
140
See generally Trinity Homes LLC v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 629 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 2010).
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In Zeig, Judge Hand relied on public policy considerations to support for his conclusion
that permitting settlements for less than the policy limit to functionally exhaust primary policies
and trigger excess coverage was sound. 141 As Hand saw it, "[t]o require an absolute collection of
the primary insurance to its full limit would in many, if not most, cases involve delay, promote
litigation, and prevent an adjustment of disputes which is both convenient and commendable." 142
Hand's utterances not withstanding, a nuanced reading of the policy effects of the Zeig approach
inevitably leads one to the opposite conclusion.

If the Zeig court's primary concern was

preventing litigation over excess coverage disputes then its reasoning, and the reasoning of
subsequent courts that have followed Zeig, likely does little to prevent parties from litigating
coverage cases in the future. Even if, under Zeig, a court would no longer have to grapple with
the question of whether below-policy-limits settlements should be found to exhaust those
policies, a thornier issue remains: "how far below the limits can the settlement be before it ceases
to be the functional equivalent" of exhaustion? 143
An examination of any of the cases implicating Zeig elucidates the shortcomings of

Hand's argument that permitting functional exhaustion maximizes judicial efficiency by
encouraging out-of-court settlement of coverage disputes. 144 There is great variance in the
proportion of the settlements with underlying insurers to the given policy's limits. In Trinity
Homes, the insured's settlements with its underlying insurers was "for at least seventy-five

percent of the policy limit, and each settlement agreement provided that [the insured] would be
141

See generally Zeig v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 23. F. 2d 665 (2d Cir. 1928). Nowhere in
the opinion does Hand provide any semblance of a legal rationale for the court's holding. The
result of this total reliance on public policy, in addition to frustrating proponents of the freedom
to contract, renders Zeig particularly vulnerable to meritorious criticisms attacking its accuracy
and continued usefulness.
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Id. at 666.
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responsible" for the resulting gap in coverage. 145 As discussed above, the court in Trinity Homes
found the settlements for seventy-five percent of the policy limits to be sufficient to trigger
excess coverage. 146 In Citigroup the insured settled with its underlying insurer for $15
million. 147 This constituted thirty percent of the policy's $50 million limit. 148 While thirty
percent does pale in comparison with the seventy-five percent settlements in Trinity Homes, in
no way does it serve as a floor for the ratios of settlement amount to policy limit that have been
litigated. In New Process the insured argued that its settlement with its primary insurer for
$850,000 should serve to functionally exhaust its primary coverage and therefore trigger excess
liability. 149 However, the primary policy covered up to $20.5 million. 150 That means that the
insured believed that its settlement with its primary insurer for a meager 3.4 percent of the
primary policy should trigger excess coverage.
No matter how one reads Judge Hand's opinion in Zeig, it fails to provide a limiting
principle of any sort to the idea that below-policy-limits settlements should be honored.
Furthermore, no subsequent case endorsing the Zeig approach has established a clear line in the
sand regarding when a settlement between primary carrier and insured will fail to trigger excess
liability. Is fifty-percent sufficient? What about twenty-five? Ten? Five? Needless to say, one
could go on and on and never arrive at a defmitive conclusion. What this means in terms of
Zeig's self-proclaimed policy rationale is that, at a minimum, it very likely has not had any

consequential impact on the amount of subsequent litigation in coverage disputes. 151 Without the

Trinity Homes, 629 F .3d at 656.
id. at 655.
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benefit of the doubt, it is easy to see how the state of the law under Zeig could result in more
litigation over exhaustion disputes than under an alternative regiment which requires full
payment of the primary policy in its entirety to trigger excess coverage.
Notwithstanding the vulnerability of Zeig' s asserted judicial efficiency justification, there
are more far-reaching and practical concerns that dictate rejecting Zeig and enforcing a stricter
four-corners approach to policy construction.

As outlined above in Part III.B-2, continued

adherence to Zeig presents significant potential consequences for insurers by denying them the
benefit of their bargain in issuing excess policies. 152 Even more troubling are the potential
detrimental effects on a systemic level that could result from too liberal an interpretation of
policy terms. In time, if forced to account for the increasing risk of coverage liability in cases
involving below policy limits settlements, excess insurers, in order to maintain economic
viability and solvency, will have little choice but to raise the rates and premiums they charge to
policyholders. 153 This in tum will, if history is any metric, make coverage inaccessible to many
due to financial concem. 154
Another alternative is that excess insurers may find certain industries or commercial
activities too risky to justify, refusing coverage "at any premium, thereby forcing these products
and services to be withdrawn from the market." 155 While the detriment to commercial enterprise
would be significant enough on its own to warrant serious concern, the potential economic
effects of a constriction in the insurance market do not end there: state and local government
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could bear a substantial portion of the resulting hardship. 156 For all of these reasons, the totality
of public policy concerns at stake favor embracing a stricter interpretation of excess insurance
policies and rejecting Zeig' s conclusions.

PART V. WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE US?: mE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
OF INSUREDS AND INSURERS MOVING FORWARD
Having concluded that the federal circuits should, in the interests of both the law and
public policy, reject Zeig's approach to the exhaustion of primary insurance policies, one is left
with several questions about how insureds and insurers must act moving forward. Historically
much analysis has been focused on the requisite efforts of insurers: namely the steps to be taken
when drafting policies to limit excess liability. 157 This trend in advising excess insurers to
preemptively avoid Zeig's thrust through more carefully constructed exhaustion clauses has
continued to be the focus of the relevant scholarly work.

158

Ultimately, however, this emphasis

on avoiding ambiguity ex-ante is not enough to guarantee against a potential fmding of excess
liability even when the insured has settled with the primary carrier for less than the policy limits:
ambiguity is often in the eye of the beholder. A closer examination of the particular policy
language employed by excess insurers in various cases demonstrates the fact that a finding of
ambiguity in a disputed policy can sometimes depend less on the explicit language and more on
the judge before whom the case is argued.
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In Trinity Homes the Seventh Circuit went to great lengths to argue that its finding for the

insured in that case hinged upon the ambiguous nature of Cincinnati's excess policy. 159
Cincinnati's "Limits oflnsurance" clause stated that coverage would be triggered "[i]fthe limits
of 'underlying insurance' have been exhausted by payment of claims."160 The court found that
while this language made it clear that excess coverage was conditioned upon the underlying
policy limit being "expended," it did not "clearly provide that the full limit must be paid out by
the [underlying] insurer alone." 161 The court rejected Cincinnati's reliance on Comerica Inc. v.
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. 162 and held that the case was distinguishable because the policy language in
Comerica was more specific in its limitations on excess coverage. 163 Ultimately the Trinity
Homes court's assertions of ambiguity regarding the required payer of the underlying insurance

are unconvincing. By their very nature, "claims" can only be paid by insurance companies.
Upon this realization it becomes clear that the both the intended and literal meaning of the
Cincinnati policy are on all fours with that in Comerica. 164 Therefore the court's conclusion that
Cincinnati's reliance on the phrase "payment of claims" permitted the inference that some other
party could be responsible for the payment of the underlying claims distorts the clear meaning of
the policy language and exceeds the bounds of reasonable contract interpretation.
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See Trinity Homes, 629 F .3d at 658.
Id. This language is similar to Zeig, where Mass. Bonding's policy read in relevant part:
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1 63 See Trinity Homes, 629 F.3d at 658-9. The policy in Comerica "required payment by the
'applicable insurers' before coverage was triggered." Id. (citing Comerica, 498 F. Supp. 2d at
1022).
164 See infra notes 160-163 and accompanying text.
160

34

Even putting aside the questionable policy interpretation in Trinity Homes, a survey of
other cases demonstrates that findings of ambiguity in excess policies can vary greatly between
jurisdictions and put litigants at significant risk of inconsistent judgments. In Citigroup one of
the excess insurers, Steadfast Insurance Company ("Steadfast"), employed language similar to
that of the defendant-insurer in Trinity Homes. 165 Steadfast's policy advised that coverage
attached "[i]n the event of the exhaustion of all of the limit[s] of liability of such 'Underlying
Insurance' solely as a result of payment of loss thereunder." 166 Like Cincinnati's policy in
Trinity Homes, the Steadfast policy made no explicit reference to the requisite payer of the
"loss." 167 However, unlike the court in Trinity Homes, the Fifth Circuit found no disqualifying
ambiguity and held that Steadfast's inclusion of the phrase "payment of loss" unequivocally
established "that the underlying insurer must make actual payment to the insured in order to
exhaust the underlying policy."168 Likewise, in Molina v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co./ 69 the Fourth
Circuit rejected the plaintiff-insured's argument that the primary insurer's insolvency
functionally exhausted the policy and triggered excess coverage under similar policy language. 170
Before Trinity Homes, even the Seventh Circuit had ruled similarly in a coverage dispute. In
Zurich Ins. Co. v. Heil Co., 171 Zurich's exhaustion clause stated that:
[i]n the event that the aggregate limits of liability of the underlying policies ... are
reduced or exhausted, the company [Zurich] shall, subject to the company's limit
of liability ... and to the other conditions of this policy, with respect to occurrences
1 65

Compare Citigroup, 649 F.3d at 373, with supra note 160 and accompanying text.
166 Citigroup, 649 F.3d at 373.
167 Id. See also supra note 161 and accompanying text.
168 Citigroup, 649 F.3d at 367 (emphasis added).
169 574 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1978).
1 7° See id. at 1178. The excess policy read in relevant part: "[i]n the event of the reduction or
exhaustion of the aggregate limit of liability of the underlying professional liability policy listed
in Schedule A by reason of losses paid thereunder, the policy ... shall constitute as underlying
insurance." Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
171 815 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1987).
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which take place during the period of this policy continue in force as excess of the
reduced primary insurance or, in the event of exhaustion, continue in force as
underlying insurance. 172
The court held this language to require that Zurich could not be liable until "after the underlying
insurer has paid claims up to its retained limit.,~ 73

What the variant results of these cases emphasize is that the traditional focus on an
insurers' efforts to preemptively avoid a fmding of ambiguity through more diligent drafting of
exhaustion clauses is insufficient to solve the problem of potentially inconsistent judgments
across the circuits.

What is ultimately required is a new understanding of the interactions

between insureds and insurers, particularly regarding settlements. In retiring 7eig's outdated and
unreasonable policy arguments, the necessary next step is acknowledging that, moving forward,
both insureds and insurers owe each other additional duties to ensure that only meritorious
claims will trigger excess liability and that settlements can more effectively promote judicial
efficiency. Not all of the duties are easily explained or adopted. However, all are essential to
maintaining the integrity of the settlement process.

A.

The Rights and Responsibilities of the Insured
Operating in a post-Zeig world, the impetus will, and should, be on the insured when

initiating settlement discussions with an insurer at any level. Perhaps the greatest inequity under
the Zeig doctrine was the opportunity it created for gamesmanship on the part of the insured.
Zeig's holding undercut the procedural protections excess insurers rely upon in issuing
policies. 174 Consequently, excess insurers could no longer be confident that claims that pierced

Id. (alterations in original).
173 I d. (emphasis added).
174 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
172
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the excess level were actually meritorious and deserving of coverage. 175 This opened to door for
insureds, in some cases, to surreptitiously and unilaterally settle claims without informing all of
the interested insurers. In Citigroup, this unilateral action manifested in Citigroup's settling of
the underlying actions with the FTC and class in California for $263 million without informing
any of its insurers, primary or excess. 176 In Comerica, the plaintiff-insured settled its claim
against the primary carrier without informing the excess insurer, Zurich. 177 The insured's
motivation for doing so can likely be found in the court's observation that Zurich, as excess
insurer, "had a fundamental dispute with [the] primary insurer as to whether [the primary] was
liable for any amount of the settlement." 178 Given the facts in Comerica, the reasonable
conclusion is that the insured, predicting Zurich's denial of coverage on the merits of the claim,
attempted to skirt around the usual protections of the primary level by settling with the primary
insurer for less than the policy limit in order to tap into Zurich's excess coverage. Ultimately the
court in Comerica rejected the insured's exhaustion argument and found that Zurich was not
liable. 179
Each of these cases demonstrates the rationale behind rejecting Zeig and enforcing a fourcomers approach to the judicial construction of excess policies. They also help to clarify the
necessary model for insureds' behavior pertaining to settlement discussions moving forward.
What is required is clarity and openness regarding any potential settlement. The responsibility of
the insured is to bring in all interested parties and get everyone in the same room to discuss the

175 See
1 76 See

supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
Citigroup, 649 F.3d at 370.
177 See Comerica, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 1032.
11a Jd.
179 Id.
See also, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 51 A.3d 445 (Del. 2012)
(plaintiff-insured, Intel, filed suit against primary insurer alone and only after below-policylimits settlement with the primary did Intel "turn to its excess insurer" for coverage).
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case at issue. When this occurs, in the vast majority of cases, rationality and risk calculation will
win the day and each insurer should be able to agree to a set of terms regarding a collective
settlement. 180 Only rarely should an insurmountable impasse arise where one insurer favors
settlement and another litigation. However, the overarching effect of this new requirement that
insureds bring in all interested parties when discussing settlement will serve to remove both the
motivation and opportunity for gamesmanship from the equation.

B.

The Rights and Responsibilities oflnsurers
Now the insured has fulfilled its duty and duly informed each of its insurers, primary or

excess, about its interest in settling its suit demanding coverage. All interested parties are sitting
around the same table to hear the insured's proposed terms.

This scenario alone, while a

significant improvement over the alternative under the Zeig doctrine, unfortunately does not
guarantee that all settlement discussions will be rationally and efficiently resolved. In most
instances, the insurers will be able to work collectively to determine each carrier's pro rata share
of any settlement with the insured. However, the danger exists that one or more of the insurers
may come to a different conclusion regarding the merits of the claim and refuse to settle under
any terms. Because after the rejection of Zeig any insured that settles with underlying carriers
will be unable to successfully argue exhaustion in bringing a claim against the non-settling
entities, one insurer's refusal to assent to the collective settlement can effectively kill the deal for
all parties. 181 In order to avoid this potentially inefficient "stag hunt" dilemma, one must
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Cf William P. Skinner, Lawrence A. Hobel, Subprime Litigation Assessing the Insurance
Issues, 41-SPG BRIEF 26, 34 (2012) ("One way to avoid the problem is to settle with all of the
insurers at the same time.")
181 See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
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conclude that in addition to the new duties owed by insureds, insurers also must account for the
interests of other insurers when conducting settlement discussions.
The source of this dilemma can be found in the unique relationship between the multiple
insurers of a single insured. It is well settled that an insured can sue its insurer for breach of
contract. 182 In addition to the explicit terms of the contract, an insurer owes the insured an
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, a violation of which risks a successful tort claim for
"bad faith." 183 While the nature of the insurer's duties owed to the insured are clearly defmed,
the duties that arise between insurers are much more opaque. In Puritan Ins. Co. v. Canadian

Universal Ins. Co., 184 the Third Circuit elaborated on the unique relationship between and among
primary and excess insurers:
[t]he relationship between the primary and excess carrier is an unusual one; each
has a separate contract with the insured, but they have none with each other.
Conflicts of interest invariably arise when the underlying tort injury is of such
severity that a recovery over the limits of the primary policy is possible. In that
circumstance, the excess carrier wishes the primary insurer to dispose of the case
within its limits and is not unduly impressed with the primary insurer's desire to
save some or all of its policy limits by a favorable verdict at trial. Conversely, the
primary carrier is unlikely to have such paternalistic feelings as will induce it to
concede its limits when there is some chance of obtaining a favorable verdict. In
each instance, one carrier is to some extent gambling with the other's money. 185
Without some other arrangement between insurers, the absence of privity could undermine the
ability of parties to effectively settle disputes without resorting to litigation.
There is of course the possibility that the market may react on its own in such a way as to
discourage holdouts in settlement discussions. 186 Insurers could attempt to "punish" those
insurance companies that routinely decide to unilaterally reject settlements in contravention of
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the wishes of the group. 187 However, courts have come up with more efficient alternative means
of promoting collective action and deterring individual insurers from torpedoing meritorious
settlement agreements for selfish motivations: the duty to settle doctrine. 188 Motivated by the
desire to limit litigation and maintain a reasonable rate structure between primary and excess
insurance coverage, many courts have permitted excess insurers to recover against underlying
insurers who "failed to settle" a claim that subsequently went to trial and returned a judgment in
excess of the underlying insurer's policy limit. 189 When the question involves the relationship
between a primary and an excess insurer, certain rights have "been recognized in favor of the
excess insurer against the primary insurer." 190 The basic rationale is that had the underlying
insurer properly settled the claim within its policy limits, the excess insurer would never have
been liable. Therefore, the primary carrier's bad faith in failing to do so can require it to
reimburse the excess carrier for any loss sustained at trial.
There are two ways through which courts have found that an excess insurer can recover
against a primary insurer for failure to properly settle a claim. The first recognizes a direct duty
from the primary to the excess insurer. This theory ho Ids that an excess insurer "is entitled to
rely on a primary insurer to not elevate its interests ahead of the excess insurer's interests." 191
Direct duty jurisdictions hold that the excess insurer is put in the same position as an insured
regarding the duties owed to it by the primary carrier. 192 While the direct duty theory has its
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supporters, 193 most courts reject it in favor of the equitable subrogation theory .194 Equitable
subrogation holds that a primary insurer's duty to the excess carrier is derived from the primary's
duty to the insured. 195 However, a successful claim under a theory of equitable subrogation
therefore hinges on the excess insurer's ability to prove that the primary carrier violated one of
its duties to the insured: since the excess insurer's rights are derivative of the insured, an asserted
injury cannot exist without a corresponding harm to the insured.

196

This innate limiting principle

has inspired criticism of equitable subrogation doctrine for its narrow scope.
However, for the purposes of operating in a post-Zeig world, the distinction between the
direct duty and equitable subrogation theories is in fact secondary to a more pressing concern.
As the law stands, a right to recover under the duty to settle doctrine, whether through a direct
duty or equitable subrogation claim, is limited in its application. The right is not reciprocal: it
exists only for the benefit of excess insurers against primary insurers. 197 Therefore no right is
recognized for the benefit of excess insurers between and amongst themselves.

This is

problematic because in the complex realm of tiered commercial insurance coverage, it is not
unlikely that the holdout will be one of many excess carriers involved in the dispute.
In order to maintain the legitimacy of settlement discussions in coverage cases involving
multiple insurers and to promote judicial efficiency, courts should expand the duties owed to
excess insurers by primary carriers to cover all relationships between insurers in a given case and
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to run reciprocally. This proposal is not a recent innovation. 198 However, the rejection of Zeig's
policy arguments and renewed emphasis on the four-comer approach to policy interpretation
make the adoption of a reciprocal set of duties between and among insurers more urgent than
ever. Since insurers stand to benefit under the new regime post-Zeig, it is only right that their
responsibilities expand correspondingly. As Professor Robert Keeton put it, "[r]egardless of the
lack of a contractual relationship between the two companies, there is a close factual
relationship--one under which they share the control over the litigation which normally would
be enjoyed by one company alone." 199 Because of the this joint control, Keeton argues, "each
should be held to a duty to the other."200
Ultimately, the circuit courts should adopt the conclusions advanced by Keeton more
than six decades ago. Only with the universal recognition of a reciprocated duty between and
amongst insurers can the courts maximize the equity and efficiency of the resolution of complex
commercial insurance disputes.
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